It comes as little surprise that Pakistanis harbor antipathy toward the United States. Support for a country’s oppressive dictator and its geopolitical enemy tends to garner a little wrath. The United States has known for some time that its policies toward Pakistan and South Asia peeved off the Pakistanis but it was a price that U.S. officials were willing to pay to achieve greater strategic goals. However callous a calculation this may seem, there now exists an equally practical strategic reason for trying to win the hearts and minds of Pakistanis: China is making inroads.
A recent poll from World Public Opinion found that Pakistan’s perception of the United States under the Obama administration has not changed substantively from its perception of the United States during George W. Bush’s reign. Only 30% of Pakistanis polled had any confidence that the U.S. president would do “the right thing regarding world affairs.” Contrast this with Pakistani opinion of China’s president, Hu Jintao, who received an 80% confidence vote on the same question.
Pakistan’s favorable view of China is consistent with political realities. India is a historical rival of Pakistan’s and a strategic rival of China’s; India even fought a brief war against China in 1962. China’s strict policy of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other nations also distinguishes it quite favorably from the United States, which has long meddled in Pakistan’s domestic affairs, most recently supporting Pakistan’s strongman dictator, General Pervez Musharaf, in spite of the will of the Pakistani people to remove him from office. As recently as the Fall of 2008, China even provided a $500 million financial aid package to Pakistan to help with its balance of payments crisis as it worked out a deal with the International Monetary Fund.
Meanwhile, the United States has provided 200-400% greater military aid to Pakistan than non-military aid since 2002. On the basis of allocations of assistance alone, it is clear where U.S. priorities have been relative to China’s. While it supported Pakistan’s dictator militarily, politically, and financially, the United States simultaneously became a closer ally with India, Pakistan’s historic rival. In 2005, the Bush administration even attempted to construct a nuclear fuel agreement with India--but not Pakistan--in clear contravention of the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Pakistanis, perhaps rightly, have little faith in U.S. policy toward South Asia while viewing their relationship with China as a positive one. In the coming age of multi-polarity, it is unlikely that China and the United States will become open enemies but, even as strategic allies, they will probably remain strategic competitors. In this context, the United States will increasingly rely on its influence, popularity, and credibility--that is, its soft power--to attain U.S. interests. Ceding soft power to a rising competitor in strategically important countries like Pakistan is no way to preserve U.S. interests. The Obama administration has started signaling that it could be changing its policy toward Pakistan and well it should. Momentum should continue to build behind this kind of change.