Making Sense Of Pak Politics: Musharraf, Zardari & Supreme Court
The longest running horror film: Pakistani Democracy

Ikram Sehgal: If the Army can stomach Zardari, why should they mind Musharraf back as president one day? Musharraf’s fate is the same as those who close their ears to good advice and shoot messengers bringing bad news.

In his analysis published in today’s The News International, Mr. Ikram Sehgal provides an interesting assessment of the latest episode in the Pakistani political circus. The focus is on Pervez Musharraf’s legal problems, the real strength of President Zardari versus Nawaz Sharif/Prime Minister Gilani. And, most importantly, why the Supreme Court of Pakistan under the restored Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry is avoiding taking up the NRO, the law that whitewashed financial corruption at the highest levels in government. Finally, Mr. Sehgal makes some interesting observations about how the Pakistani military leadership could be viewing this mess.

On Musharraf’s Fate:

Pervez Musharraf must be content in his London apartment, in less than a year Zardari has replaced him as the unpopular figure in Pakistan. Unlike Zardari, Musharraf always enjoyed a base of popularity. Given the present abysmal performance of the Zardari-Gilani government, this will force-multiply exponentially. If the Army can stomach Zardari, why should they mind Musharraf back as president one day? Even though Musharraf's Oct 12, 1999, takeover was illegal in all senses of the word, in all fairness it was popular in the streets with both the intelligentsia and the masses fed up with bad governance. No tears were shed for the Nawaz Sharif regime. Almost everyone welcomed, myself included, a military coup in the name of hope, or as hope is known in Pakistan, "the doctrine of necessity." That public faith in Pervez Musharraf eroded dramatically after the rigged 2002 elections was no surprise. That is the fate of all who close their ears to good advice and shoot messengers bringing bad news. As long as Asif Zardari does not meddle with the military, and until now he has shown no inclination for this rather fatal pastime, the military hierarchy seems more comfortable having him (Kayani was DG ISI before he became COAS, he cannot claim ignorance about all the Zardari controversies) around than Mian Sahib. One can understand the Army's lack of enthusiasm in repealing the 17th Amendment and Clause 58 (2) (b). Why shackle themselves for the next time around? It stands to reason they seem supportive (as does the US) of a strong president and an ineffectual prime minister.


On Whether Zardari Is Cornered:

Despite being under pressure lately, Zardari has made notable accomplishments. The success of sorts in Swat has been bought at a heavy price, the blood of our young men in uniform. Sufi Muhammad took a day as a sign of weakness the abject and shameful surrender by Pakistan's Parliament in its passage of a resolution for so-called peace in less than a day. The Taliban were not prepared for the outraged reaction of the Pakistani public. Their attempt to brutally take over Swat and adjacent districts was fully exploited by the Army. That most of the IDPs are returning is a clear measure of the military's success (and, it so happens, Zardari's). Complete success will only be possible when Maulana Fazlullah and his top aides are physically eliminated. Surviving March 15 virtually unscathed is a credit to Zardari's political craftsmanship, being reduced to a figurehead president is certainly not in keeping with his personality, or the shenanigans of his friends. A master of the art of playing for time, he has again consigned the 17th Amendment to the cold storage of a parliamentary committee. Yusuf Reza Gilani vacillated in the name of party unity when the opportunity arose to get back the prime minister's powers under the 1973 Constitution. By not maintaining the March 15 momentum he blew his chances. That the Supreme Court decision overturning Mian Sahib's conviction on the aircraft hijack case came the same day as Zardari's Raiwind visit is no coincidence. Zardari needed to head off Mian Nawaz Sharif running loose in the National Assembly with Gilani on constitutional issues.

On Double Standards Of Nawaz Sharif & THE RESTORED CHIEF JUSTICE:

While Mian Sahib must be congratulated for not becoming another political beneficiary of the infamous National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), nonetheless his "democratic" silence about this blackest of black laws is intriguing. Even though it seems they presently seem to lack enthusiasm, there seems to be method in the Supreme Court's benign ignorance of something that has disfigured Pakistan's politics and threatens our existence as a nation. At present all eyes are on the Supreme Court as they decide on the blatantly illegal Nov 3 action. The NRO will have to be addressed; his lordships cannot ignore it forever under "a doctrine of necessity." Ordinary mortals do expect that their lordships while suo moto-ing everything under the sun, will ultimately address this black hole in Pakistan's heart. The NRO provides for London being the first (and Dubai the second) home for our leaders. Our leaders alternate in giving us bad governance, collect their booty (and their gifts which seems to be their right by being president and/or prime minister), and go back to London (and Dubai), at least till all is forgotten and forgiven by our gullible masses, and their popularity returns.

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